posted 11-16-2016 12:12 AM               

quote:

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Originally posted by Charlie16:
Thank you Daniel for your effort.

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posted 11-16-2016 12:23 AM               

quote:

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Originally posted by mikepf:
I may not comment often, but do read them and always look forward to them.

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posted 11-16-2016 11:53 AM               

As you may be aware, if you are following my recent posts, I'm recalling and documenting, as best I can, my experience as PLSS/OPS EVA Crew Training manager. So far I've documented experiences with the PLSS training Cryopacks.

When I looked at your posted photo, I noticed Astronaut Haise was wearing another training version of the PLSS that we named the "Air Pack" as it supplied breathable gaseous air to the astronaut through the red hose (in the photo) rather than cryogenic liquid air as I've explained with the Cryopack.

You can look forward to future posts that will explain in detail why it was necessary to utilize the Air Pack as well as OTHER training Life Support configurations.

posted 11-21-2016 02:16 AM               

As we all know, meeting the deadline set by President Kennedy before the end of the decade, Dec. 31, 1969 to land a man on the moon and bring him back safely, required meeting schedules that seemed unrealistic to many and achievable to some, i.e. schedule deadlines that, at least for me, did not give me time to contemplate the reality of my responsibility to provide reliable hardware (PLSS/OPS) for each and every EVA training exercise for Apollo 11 through Apollo 17, hardware, that would provide the "life sustaining" breathable air, carbon dioxide removal, communications and cooling.

I had my challenges, and very real concerns about hardware reliability and future potential problems. My very first concern was that the cryopacks did not come with a "paperwork" trail, meaning that there were absolutely no written procedures to inspect and test the cryopack. Yes, that's exactly what I said!

When I asked for inspection and testing procedures, I was told that they do not exist! I was, as you can well imagine, very concerned, to say the least. Every other "life support" (life support being the operative word) hardware system whether used for flight or training required procedures for periodic testing and inspection, procedures for inspecting hose lines, line fittings, hose nozzles for cracks, nicks, cuts, etc. There were also no requirements for functional testing to confirm that all system and component specifications were met, neither informally or formally with a KSC approved and signed document. The cryopacks did not even have a data package that would have included the inspection, testing, charging, cleaning, malfunction and repair history. Being so involved with testing flight PLSS/OPSs, all I could do was "scratch my head" in disbelief!

An example of life support equipment that included the normal requirements for documentation, as I discussed, is the astronaut purge and transfer ventilator that was maintained by the Bendix Corporation at KSC. The ventilator as many of you know, was a handheld unit with a suit inlet and outlet hose connected to the suited astronaut that was used to pre-oxygenate (in a 100% oxygen environment) the astronaut prior to decompression for transfer from the suit room to either chamber tests or transfer to the launch pad via a "transfer van."

posted 11-23-2016 12:25 AM               

Not only were the flight PLSSs tested and inspected many times over following very detailed and approved signed procedures, they also provided telemetry to monitor bio-medical and PLSS performance data and included a built in out of spec alert system, i.e. audio alarms and remote control unit visual alerts that prompted the crew member to implement practiced emergency procedures.

Knowing that potential reliability problems existed along with the inability to monitor astronaut EKG and cryopack real time functional performance, I tried my best to implement astronaut EVA "work around" monitoring procedures that first and foremost addressed the "SAFETY" of the crew.

Our cryopack training briefing was based on monitoring procedures used at MSC. As we discovered, there were no formal crew "SAFETY" procedures. As I became more familiar with the PLSS training cryopacks after supporting several crew training exercises, I was able to generate astronaut safety procedures based on "what I had to work with!" I subsequently incorporated my written procedures in a document appropriately titled "Procedures For Testing The Astronaut Training Cryogenic Life Support Back Pack," KSC Procedure NO: CTE-H-3001/KL-9650. This, in fact, was the inspection and testing procedural document that did not exist, a document that should have been written before the cryopacks were approved for astronaut life support.

Before I discuss the astronaut crew training EVA "SAFETY" procedures I wrote, it is necessary to define specific cryopack components that are identified in the subject procedures. In cryopack photo #1 (below), I've identified Suit Pressure Gauge "A," System Pressure Gauge "B," Suit Pressure Control Knob "C" and Vent Valve "D."

posted 11-23-2016 12:38 AM               

In case of either a suit pressure emergency (low or high) or a system pressure emergency (low or high) the hinged cryopack door permitted easy access to both the suit pressure control valve "C" and vent valve "D." These were the valves that were referred to be used in my safety procedures to follow.

Following are the safety procedures that I wrote and implemented:

posted 11-23-2016 01:23 AM               

In photo #4, astronaut UV visors are engaged covering the helmet preventing awareness of Symptom #4 (visor fogging) and preventing Action #4 implementation.

In photo #5, Apollo 13 LMP Haise's UV visor is not completely covering his helmet. With the UV visor partially up, there is room to "peek" in to see if his helmet was fogging, i.e. Symptom #4 in Safety Procedures.

posted 11-23-2016 01:48 AM               

Communication capability with the astronauts via the portable ground stations was the last "lifeline" remaining to monitor the physiological condition of the crew. We were very cognizant of this situation and I met with each EVA training mission test conductor before the first training exercise for that mission. I discussed my "SAFETY" procedures and in the case of the photo #6 scenario (visors down, gauges blocked), I suggested and they all agreed they would ask the crew if they were okay about every ten (10) minutes. It was agreed that I would keep track of the time and would signal the test conductor by pointing to the crew when I knew I had the attention of the test conductor.

posted 11-23-2016 01:59 AM               

In photo #7, the rover is not moving and it appears that I'm trying to catch my breath after running and carrying the ground station.

posted 11-23-2016 02:56 AM               

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Originally posted by Apolloman:
Dan, what is the black box (communication system?) on the PLSS door on this picture?

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The black box is, in fact, a communications unit that was used before it was decided that the version in the photo did not function as expected. The cryopacks that we used at KSC relied on the flight PLSS unit made by RCA.

What you are looking at is a communications unit that had two connectors. One connector went to the PGA comm connector in turn connected to the astronaut "snoopy" head set. The second connector went to an external battery that was sometimes hooked on to the slot on the cryopack door and sometimes carried by a suit tech following the astronaut. You can see the thinner black cable fed through a hole in the door.

posted 11-28-2016 12:21 AM               

• At 9:00 a.m., one day before the scheduled exercise I called the KSC Crew Systems Division (CSD) EVA Test Conductor to confirm that the exercise was a "go."

• If the test was on, I called the Bendix Corporation located at KSC Hanger S to schedule four cryopacks to be charged (filled) with liquid air the day before the scheduled exercise.

• The four cryopacks were loaded into the HSD government issued Dodge van and were transported to Bendix.
  
  
• The charged cryopacks were picked up from Bendix at 8 a.m. the next day (morning of the scheduled exercise) and brought back to the HSD building. They remained in the van until it was time to drive to the KSC Crew Training Building in time for the scheduled exercise.

EVA training exercises were scheduled to last from one to 2.5 hours. The designed nominal cryopack operational time was 1.5 hrs. With two available charged cryopacks for each crewman, a nominal combined cryopack operational time of three hours was possible with a half hour to spare. This was the criteria I used for setting up and managing the KSC EVA training program.

As we've all experienced, things don't always work as designed and planned. The cryopacks were no exception. One of my first negative experiences occurred during an indoor EVA exercise with Apollo 12 LMP Al Bean.

About 25 minutes after the beginning of the "run" (exercise) one of my two HSD techs came over to me and said that astronaut Bean's cryopack pressure was slowly decreasing from the nominal 160 psi operating pressure.

I notified the test conductor. As per the "EVA Cryopack/Suit Training Safety Procedures" that I authored (outlined in a previous post), the crewman had no more than 15 minutes of breathable air remaining. The test conductor asked if he could have about five minutes to complete the deployment of the Solar Wind Spectrometer (seen in the below photo). I said yes to the test conductor and when the deployment task was completed, my HSD tech (per the Symptom/Action Safety Procedures) decreased the system pressure to 0 psi. Astronaut Bean was led to his suit donning/doffing chair, suit pressure was reduced to 0 psi and Al's helmet was removed.

For those of you that have a sense of humor, I thought it would be amusing to compare the Solar Wind Experiment to R2D2 (below photo).

To continue the exercise, the second cryopack was secured to crewman Bean and the exercise continued as if "nothing happened!" Picture the following scenario. Knowing that the first cryopack operated for 25 minutes, knowing that the replacemet second cryopack theoretically had 1.5 hours of normal operation and knowing the total test time (test conductor's estimate) was two hours and 15 minutes we had a problem.

Even if the replacement cryopack lasted 1.5 hours (of course, after what happened with the first unit, I had my doubts), we were short 20 minutes. I tried not to panic. I calmly went to the wall phone (below photo) and called Bendix saying we had an "emergency" situation that required charging a cryopack. My Bendix contact was very cooperative and asked what he could do.

I said I was sending my tech Ray with the cryopack to him to be immediately charged so it could be returned to the Crew Training Building within one hour. I left myself a 15 minute buffer as the exercise had already run 15 minutes before my tech left the building and headed for the Bendix facility.

I was mentally in "panic mode" but I tried not to show it. I prayed that the replacement cryopack would last for the expected 1.5 hours and that my tech would return within the planned hour. I called Bendix twice for a status update. My primary concern was for HSD to not be responsible for shutting down a crew training exercise before all objectives were completed.

About a minute before my remaining HSD tech (we always had two) notified me that the system pressure of the cryopack in use began to decrease, in walked my tech Ray carrying the recharged pack with very little time to spare. Bottom line, the exercise was successfully completed.

The fact that the run might have been cut short, was known only by three individuals, i.e. me and my two HSD techs! And that's the "rest of the story!"

posted 12-02-2016 02:14 AM               

We found that the cryopack leaked a significant amount of air between the time it was filled during a Bendix second shift at about 8 p.m. the evening before the scheduled exercise and the beginning of the crew training exercise the following day at 2PM. The cryopacks were designed to hold their full charge for a minimum of 16 hours with very minimal subsequent hourly leakage.

The answer to your question "Did we schedule more than four cryopacks" is a resounding "yes." Fortunately we had a total of six units with two that I designated as non-charged backups, until after we experienced the problem.

The leakage problem turned out to be an inherent design flaw that required future modifications at MSC. We were not able to send the cryopacks to MSC until after Apollo 13 EVA training was completed when we received two additional cryopacks from MSC with the same leakage problems! (I plan to tell the whole story in detail in future posts.)

With the two additional cryopacks giving us a total of eight units, we were able to send two cryopacks to MSC for modification. When the "modified" cryopacks were returned to KSC we sent two more, etc.

I plan to include the detailed story of all the decisions I made as a result of continuing cryopack problems. I will say, and I am very proud to say that despite all the problems, we never missed a crew training exercise nor did we have to cut a run short.

As you mentioned, the astronauts recognized that they were not training with flight hardware, however, they, nor the test conductor were concerned as we were always able to switch out packs when there were problems.

Also, as I will discuss in future posts, I coordinated the use of substitute "air packs" that were connected by a long hose to an air supply both inside and outside when conditions were warranted.

posted 12-02-2016 12:23 PM               

My most important goal is to inspire youth around the world to pursue a future in the exploration of the universe.

posted 12-02-2016 01:21 PM            

Not sure if there was ever an "Apollo Experience Report" about the EVA crew training at KSC, but with your knowledge and experience, you certainly would be the person to author such a document.

posted 12-03-2016 01:05 AM               

There was so much creative thinking that lead to so many problem solutions that no one but those intimately involved are aware of.

I was recently looking at a photo of myself (below) where I appeared to be reading or as my wife said it looked like I was praying. No, in fact, I was evaluating, commenting on, and proposing changes to procedures for using the astronaut EMU maintenance kit. The maintenance kit was one of those "unsung" unused Apollo EMU components that, in my opinion, was one the of the most "creative packaging concepts" and an excellent example of the creative thinking that helped us achieve mission goals.

I want to share with you the functional details and creative packaging of this amazing EMU component that I was fortunate enough to have worked with as follows:

The EMU maintenance kit contained cleaning, replacement and repair parts including supplies for in flight maintenance of the Apollo Pressure Garment Assembly (PGA) and the Extra-Vehicular Visor Assembly (EVVA).

The EMU maintenance kit graphic below illustrates three photos of the maintenance kit, i.e. closed, partially open and fully open.

The photo in the graphic is me (Dan) evaluating procedural use changes that were made to the kit based on previous astronaut feedback. After my evaluation and consensus approval, the changes were ready for the astronauts to re-evaluate and comment on.

The EMU maintenance kit consisted of two primary sections. First is the pocket assembly (Figure A below). The pocket assembly, held closed by hook and pile fastener strips, folded out to reveal four pockets containing items labeled 8, 9, 10 and 11 as follows:

• FABRIC REPAIR TAPE (8)
  The Fabric Repair Tape was made of fiber glass and was cut in two lengths (1"x 36") wrapped individually to a nylon rod. A Beta cord lanyard connected a strip of Velcro (hook) to the rod. The tape was stowed in the pocket seen in Figure A.

  The Fabric Repair Tape was intended to be used to complete small repairs to layers of the Integrated Thermal Micro-Meteoroid Garment (ITMG) and Cover Layer Assembly (CLA) or used in conjunction with a Teflon coated Beta cloth patch (9 in Figure A) when repairs to abraded, cut, or torn areas of the ITMG or CLA were required.

• BETA CLOTH REPAIR PATCHES (9)
  Two 5" x 5" squares of Beta cloth were available to be used to repair abraded, cut, or torn areas of the ITMG or CLA. The two patches were "rolled up" and stowed in the pocket seen in Figure A.

• LUBRICANT PADS (10)
  Eight oil saturated pads were included to be used to lubricate pressure sealing slide fasteners, seals and "O" rings.The pads were stowed in the pocket seen in Figure A.

• SEAL REMOVAL TOOL (11)
  The Seal Removal Tool is a nylon rod with an angled preformed tip which facilitates the removal of "O" ring seals for replacement in the PGA Wrist Disconnect, Pressure Relief Valve, Helmet Feed Port, Oxygen connectors and LCG water connector.

  A lanyard with a Velcro (pile) fastener strip is attached to the tool. Temporary stowage is accomplished by engaging the pile strip with any Velcro (hook) strip. The tool was stowed in the pocket seen in Figure A.

posted 12-03-2016 01:36 AM               

The six pouches and their contents are as follows:

• REPAIR PATCHES (POUCH 1)
  Contained three repair patches to be used in conjunction with sealant in pouch 2 (Figure B-2). The patches were to be used to seal accidental punctures in the Neoprene coated Nylon fabric of the Pressure Containing Bladder (PCB) portion of the Torso Limb Suit Assembly (TLSA).
  

• BLADDER REPAIR SEALANT (POUCH 2)
  Contained five measured portions of Sealant to be used in conjunction with the repair patches (pouch 1) to seal accidental punctures in the primary bladder of the Pressure Containing Bladder (PCG).

• REPLACEMENT RUBBER SEAL (POUCH 3)
  Contained a large replacement seal for either the right or left Suit Glove Wrist Disconnect.
  

• REPLACEMENT SEALS (POUCH 4)
  Contained three Spare Replacement "O" Rings for the suit Pressure Relief Valve (PRV), Helmet Feed Port and the third for any of the suit Oxygen Connectors or the suit Liquid Cooling Garment (LCG) Multiple Water Connector.

• CLEANING AND ANTI-FOG PADS (POUCH 5)
  Contained six Treated Pads (two in each of three sealed pouch pockets) to be used to clean and provide anti-fog treatment to the optical surfaces of the Primary Helmet Assembly (PHA), Extra-Vehicular Visor Assembly (EVVA) and the Slip On Helmet Shield.
  

• MAINTENANCE KIT INSTRUCTIONS (POUCH 6)
  Instructions on the Front Side (Front 6 below) of the pouch, address Lubrication of Seals, "O" Rings and Slide Fasteners.

  Instructions on the Back Side (Back 6 below) of the pouch address ITMG Repair, Pressure Control Bladder Repair, Helmet viewing area Cleaning and Anti-Fog treatment.

  

posted 08-24-2017 01:09 PM            

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Originally posted by Daniel on the Moon:
Therefore, I have to conclude that Cernan is still our subject.

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posted 09-15-2017 11:19 PM               

The very first section of the notebook was titled "Exploring Space" (Graphic 2). Included in this section were answers to questions, i.e. "Reasons For Space Travel", "What will we find in Space", "Problems of Space Travel" and other space travel related questions (Graphic 3).

In Graphic 4, "Anatomy Of The First US Satellite", I drew my interpretation of the Vanguard 1 Satellite that would have been the first US orbital Satellite if it was not for a launch failure on December 6, 1957.

When I wrote about the Vanguard, neither I nor anyone in the scientific community were aware that the Soviet Union was about to launch Sputnik. I cannot speak for the rest of the world at the time but I was totally devastated as I was and had been a "space fanatic" since the age of ten.

My evolving interest in space travel began when I discovered and began religiously watching the TV series "Captain Video and his Video Rangers" in 1953. When the "Flash Gordon" TV series came on air in October of 1954 I had two Space Related TV series to inspire my desire to someday be involved in Space Exploration.

The devastating feeling after Sputnik turned into cautious optimism when the US successful launched its first Satellite, Explorer 1 on January 31, 1958. From that point on my dream was kept alive by the incredible U.S. space program successes and the rest is history!