posted 05-31-2015 12:21 PM               

I know the amount of money and where it comes from is an issue, but it was a simple error that took the spacecraft. If not for that... they'd be flying by now.

posted 05-31-2015 02:27 PM               

quote:

---

Originally posted by Robert Pearlman:
The BBC spoke with two. Not exactly a statistically relevant sampling.

---

posted 06-09-2015 12:59 PM               

Virgin Galactic: Introducing our Pilot Corps

An introduction to our Pilot Corps, narrated by Virgin Galactic's Chief Pilot, Dave Mackay, including behind the scenes shots of our Spaceship factory.

posted 07-28-2015 09:25 AM               

Virgin Galactic released its submission to the NTSB investigation today. Per the company's fact sheet:

The Probable Cause of this accident was the copilot's unlocking of SpaceShipTwo's feather locks at 0.92 Mach, approximately 14 seconds prior to the flight manual minimum speed of 1.4 Mach.

The Feather Lock system design did not have an automatic mechanical inhibit to prevent premature movement of the feather system.

Scaled Composites' aircrew procedures did not require a challenge/response protocol prior to moving the feather lock handle.

posted 07-28-2015 10:34 AM               

1. Although the copilot made the required 0.8 Mach callout at the correct point in the flight, he incorrectly unlocked the feather immediately afterward instead of waiting until SpaceShipTwo reached the required speed of 1.4 Mach.

2. The unlocking of the feather during the transonic region resulted in uncommanded feather operation because the external aerodynamic loads on the feather flap assembly were greater than the capability of the feather actuators to hold the assembly in the unfeathered position with the locks disengaged.

3. The copilot was experiencing high workload as a result of recalling tasks from memory while performing under time pressure and with vibration and loads that he had not recently experienced, which increased the opportunity for errors.

4. The pilot and copilot were properly certificated and qualified. Fatigue and medical and pathological issues were not factors in this accident. The recovered vehicle components showed no evidence of any structural, system, or rocket motor failures before the in-flight breakup.

5. SpaceShipTwo's instantaneous impact point on the day of the accident was consistent with the requirements of 14 Code of Federal Regulations 437.57, "Operating Area Containment."

6. Although Scaled Composites' systems safety analysis (SSA) correctly identified that uncommanded feather operation would be catastrophic during the boost phase of flight and that multiple independent system failures had to occur to result in this hazard, the SSA process was inadequate because it resulted in an analysis that failed to (1) identify that a single human error could lead to unintended feather operation during the boost phase and (2) consider the need to more rigorously verify and validate the effectiveness of the planned mitigation measures.

7. By not considering human error as a potential cause of uncommanded feather extension on the SpaceShipTwo vehicle, Scaled Composites missed opportunities to identify the design and/or operational requirements that could have mitigated the consequences of human error during a high workload phase of flight.

8. Scaled Composites did not ensure that the accident pilots and other SpaceShipTwo test pilots adequately understood the risks of unlocking the feather early.

9. Human factors should be emphasized in the design, operational procedures, hazard analysis, and flight crew simulator training for a commercial space vehicle to reduce the possibility that human error during operations could lead to a catastrophic event.

10. The Federal Aviation Administration Office of Commercial Space Transportation's evaluations of Scaled Composites' initial and first renewal of the SpaceShipTwo experimental permit application were deficient because the evaluations failed to recognize that Scaled Composites' hazard analysis did not meet regulatory requirements to identify hazards caused by human error.

11. The lack of direct communications between Federal Aviation Administration Office of Commercial Space Transportation technical staff and ScaledComposites technical staff, the pressure to approve experimental permit applications within a 120-day review period, and the lack of a defined line between public safety and mission safety assurance interfered with the Federal Aviation Administration's ability to thoroughly evaluate the SpaceShipTwo experimental permit applications.

12. The Federal Aviation Administration Office of Commercial Space Transportation did not ensure that Scaled Composites was in compliance with the mitigations cited in the waiver from regulatory requirements or determine whether those mitigations would adequately address human errors with catastrophic consequences.

13. The experimental permit preapplication consultation process would be more effective if it were to begin during a commercial space vehicle's design phase so that concerns can be resolved before a commercial space vehicle is developed and manufactured and potential catastrophic hazards resulting from human error can be identified early.

14. The effectiveness of the Federal Aviation Administration Office of Commercial Space Transportation's inspection process would be improved if inspectors were assigned to commercial space operators rather than individual commercial space launch operations because the inspectors could become more familiar with the operators' training and procedures and could identify ways to enhance safety.

15. A database of lessons learned from commercial space mishap investigations would provide mutual benefits to public safety and industry promotion and would thus be consistent with the Federal Aviation Administration's mission and authority.

16. Scaled Composites and local emergency response officials could improve their emergency readiness for future test flights by making better use of available helicopter assets.

17. Additional parachute training and procedures would have better prepared Scaled Composites' test pilots for emergency situations.

The National Transportation Safety Board determines that the probable cause of this accident was Scaled Composites' failure to consider and protect against the possibility that a single human error could result in a catastrophic hazard to the SpaceShipTwo vehicle. This failure set the stage for the copilot's premature unlocking of the feather system as a result of time pressure and vibration and loads that he had not recently experienced, which led to uncommanded feather extension and the subsequent aerodynamic overload and in-flight breakup of the vehicle.

posted 07-28-2015 12:00 PM               

Earlier this morning, the NTSB, America's independent safety board, led by Chairman Christopher Hart, held a public meeting about last year's flight test accident in Mojave. That test, carried out by our contractors, Scaled Composites, tragically resulted in the death of one of their pilots, Mike Alsbury, and of course destroyed the spaceship that Scaled was developing for Virgin Galactic' s eventual use.

While it is good to have passed this milestone and be able to focus on the future, we are acutely aware that it does not alter the fact that this was at heart a human tragedy. Our thoughts go out again today to the family, friends and colleagues of Mike.

We are thankful to the NTSB for conducting and completing a thorough investigation – as well as for the clarity of their findings and recommendations, all of which will help make the fledgling commercial space industry safer and better.

Contrary to some initial speculation, the NTSB made clear that the spaceship Scaled Composites had designed, built and then flew for us was performing exactly as it should have. We can therefore be certain that among other things, the rocket motor was working perfectly, the vehicle's airframe performed as it had been designed, and the cockpit displays were all fully functional.

In short, the NTSB has been able to confirm its initial statements as to the cause of the accident: that the feather, a unique system used for the spaceship's safe re-entry from space, was manually and prematurely unlocked by Scaled's pilot.

The NTSB board also looked closely at whether the Scaled Composite's accident meant Virgin Galactic should change its own procedures for future test flights and commercial operations, or indeed the design of future vehicles. We cooperated fully with the investigation, and the NTSB has made no recommendations for the company. Over the past months, our engineers have already designed a mechanism to prevent the feather from being unlocked at the wrong time.

We also have a truly incredible pilot corps with unparalleled experience covering an enormously diverse range of commercial, military and space vehicles, and we will continue to prepare and train them for commercial space service. With the investigation completed, Virgin Galactic can now focus fully on the future with a clean bill of health and a strengthened resolve to achieve its goals.

But there are some things that will take a lot more time to heal.

Every new transformative technology requires risk, and we have seen the tragic and brave sacrifice of Mike and the recovery of injured surviving pilot Pete Siebold. Their tremendous efforts are not in vain and will serve to strengthen our resolve to make big dreams come true.

Thank you to all who have helped us get this far and to all who will continue to help open space safely, for the benefit of life on Earth.

posted 07-29-2015 10:46 PM               

While Sir Richard was so relieved to find out that this was pilot error and his spaceship was perfectly designed and functioning normally, the Board was not so quick to point fingers.

Their probable cause statement,

The National Transportation Safety Board determines that the probable cause of this accident was Scaled Composites’ failure to consider and protect against the possibility that a single human error could result in a catastrophic hazard to the SpaceShipTwo vehicle. This failure set the stage for the copilot’s premature unlocking of the feather system as a result of time pressure and vibration and loads that he had not recently experienced, which led to uncommanded feather extension and the subsequent aerodynamic overload and in-flight breakup of the vehicle.

As is typical, a little blame is sprinkled around to the FAA, their Commercial Spaceflight Office in particular, and their failure to catch such a flaw in Scaled's risk analysis. Anyone who has worked with the bureaucracy that is the FAA understands how ironic this is. I think red tape was invented there.

Most shocking to me is how the Board completely ignored an elephant in the room, that being the use of pressure suits. They made observations and recommendations about parachute training and having rescue helicopters more available in the event of another crash, but did nothing to address this big issue.

Without getting into my own opinion on the subject, I just found it simply astounding that the Board would pass on such an opportunity to present their own recommendations. I have no doubt that there were observations made about the survivability of such an accident, given that this one produced two different results.

Siebold was extremely lucky that his automatic gear deployed his parachute given that he was unconscious for most of his freefall. I have to wonder what was learned about Alsbury's survival potential during the investigation. Maybe when the final report is published we will find out.

posted 07-30-2015 10:54 AM               

If I'm flying along at altitude and accidentally snag the flap handle, and it is predicted that the deployment of the flaps at high speed cause the aircraft to rip apart, then the flap handle should be designed with detents or a guard to prevent that.

Even car designers are bringing modern technology into their products with collision avoidance systems, heads-up displays, and even automatic parallel parking!

The key is that you find all of the potentials for mechanical and human error (even the ones that you think could never happen), then either accept the risk, eliminate it, or mitigate it to an acceptable level. The most complex potential for failure is that interface between the technology and the human.

posted 08-06-2015 03:19 PM               

Here's a photo of the new SpaceShipTwo under WhiteKnightTwo, taken yesterday. More work to do, but we're making steady progress.

posted 08-07-2015 01:27 AM               

16. Scaled Composites and local emergency response officials could improve their emergency readiness for future test flights by making better use of available helicopter assets.