posted 12-30-2008 10:30 AM               

The report is expected to be released at 11:00 a.m. CDT with a media telecon scheduled for later this afternoon.

Irene Klotz with Discovery News asked NASA spokesman David Mould about the timing of the report, coming out between Christmas and New Year's.

Mould advised not reading too much into that, but later added, "The timing was coordinated to some degree with the families of the astronauts. We work with them to make sure things like timing was good for them. We want to be sensitive to those folks."

posted 12-30-2008 11:16 AM               

NASA commissioned the Columbia Accident Investigation Board (CAIB) to conduct a thorough review of both the technical and the organizational causes of the loss of the Space Shuttle Columbia and her crew on February 1, 2003. The accident investigation that followed determined that a large piece of insulating foam from Columbia's external tank (ET) had come off during ascent and struck the leading edge of the left wing, causing critical damage. The damage was undetected during the mission. The CAIB's findings and recommendations were published in 2003 and are available on the web. NASA responded to the CAIB findings and recommendations with the Space Shuttle Return to Flight Implementation Plan. Significant enhancements were made to NASA's organizational structure, technical rigor, and understanding of the flight environment. The ET was redesigned to reduce foam shedding and eliminate critical debris. In 2005, NASA succeeded in returning the space shuttle to flight. In 2010, the space shuttle will complete its mission of assembling the International Space Station and will be retired to make way for the next generation of human space flight vehicles: the Constellation Program.

The Space Shuttle Program recognized the importance of capturing the lessons learned from the loss of Columbia and her crew to benefit future human exploration, particularly future vehicle design. The program commissioned the Spacecraft Crew Survival Integrated Investigation Team (SCSIIT). The SCSIIT was asked to perform a comprehensive analysis of the accident, focusing on factors and events affecting crew survival, and to develop recommendations for improving crew survival for all future human space flight vehicles. To do this, the SCSIIT investigated all elements of crew survival, including the design features, equipment, training, and procedures intended to protect the crew. This report documents the SCSIIT findings, conclusions, and recommendations.

• Columbia Crew Survival Investigation Report (16.2mb PDF)

• NASA Fact Sheet: Space Shuttle and Constellation Program Actions Resulting From SCSIIT Recommendations (36K PDF)

posted 12-30-2008 11:50 AM               

NASA Report Reviews Crew Safety Measures During Columbia Accident, Recommends Improvements

NASA has completed a comprehensive study of crew safety equipment and procedures used during the space shuttle Columbia accident with recommendations for improving the safety of all future human spaceflights.

A media teleconference will be held at 3 p.m. CST Tuesday to discuss the report. Audio of the teleconference will be streamed live.

The teleconference participants are Wayne Hale, deputy associate administrator for strategic partnerships; astronaut Pam Melroy, deputy project manager for the investigation team; Nigel Packham, project manager for the investigation team; and Jeff Hanley, Constellation program manager.

"The members of this team have done an outstanding job under difficult and personal circumstances," said Johnson Space Center Director Michael L. Coats. "Their work will ensure that the legacy of Columbia and her heroic crew continues to be the improved safety of future human spaceflights worldwide."

The team's final report includes 30 recommendations to improve spacecraft design and crew safety. The recommendations cover a broad range of subjects from crew training, procedures, restraints and individual safety equipment to spacecraft design methods and recommendations regarding future accident investigations.

NASA already has implemented some of the report's recommendations and is evaluating others. A fact sheet describing actions that have been taken or are in work by both the Space Shuttle Program and Constellation Program as a result of the investigation is available at the same web link as the report.

This was the first-ever in-depth crew survival study of a spaceflight accident. The investigation was conducted by a multi-disciplinary NASA team based at NASA's Johnson Space Center. The study team also consulted experts outside of NASA for portions of its work.

posted 12-30-2008 03:43 PM               

I would recommend that people take a crack at it though before they open up their local news source and get a sensationalized version of the findings.

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Kind Regards

Douglas Henry

posted 12-30-2008 08:04 PM               

The report is fascinating to read in its depth of analysis and correlation of all of the available data. It was somewhat reassuring to read the conclusion that even though the crew knew something was wrong, they likely did not know that a catastrophic failure was imminent. Their actions following loss of communications were consistent with troubleshooting the situation. Sudden cabin depressurization rendered them unconscious almost immediately upon cabin breach, before the violent tumbling that led to their deaths.

posted 12-31-2008 01:35 AM               

quote:

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Originally posted by ilbasso:
It was somewhat reassuring to read the conclusion that even though the crew knew something was wrong, they likely did not know that a catastrophic failure was imminent.

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I'm not entirely sure I get the same impression from the report. There was about 46 seconds from loss of signal (LOS) to the catastrophic event (CE) that likely resulted in loss of cabin pressure (with was a lethal event). They knew before the LOS that the tire pressures readings were off, which was itself a bad sign. Then they got the Master Alarm right after the last transmission. The flight deck crew would also become aware of the loss of control shortly after the LOS. That left them with at least 40 seconds of consciousness to deal with the loss of control, which they surely understood was an extremely serious situation that signaled a major problem with the orbiter...and an impending disaster if they couldn't quickly regain control. It appears they attempted various actions, such as APU re-starts, thinking perhaps that could help them re-gain control of the hydraulics (which had bled dry by this point). During this time, the Gs were also building up in the cabin...but not to the point where they couldn't still take actions. I'm guessing they had to know the vehicle was undergoing significant stresses, however...and that it couldn't withstand that abuse for much longer. (They probably didn't know, however, that they were shedding their left wing and left OMS pod at this time.)

Even if they didn't know how imminent the orbiter breakup was, they had to know they were fighting for their lives...and could likely see it was quickly becoming a losing battle.

The report indicates that none of the crew closed their visors, surmising that the crew was still in the mode of trying to work the problem rather than moving to a mode of survival. One wonders if they were simply too busy to bother with the visors or whether they knew such actions were likely pointless at that altitude and velocity.

In the end, it was probably a blessing that they didn't close their visors to prepare for depressurization. It probably allowed them to meet their end more quickly and painlessly than the four other "lethal events" that followed.

posted 12-31-2008 06:05 AM               

As for the knowing that they were in a bad situation, we won't know that one at all. But one thing I do know as a pilot is that if you are busy with a task, you try to devote as much time to resolving an issue as opposed to thinking about anything else. You fall back on your training. To me, if they had felt the situation was hopeless, Husband probably would have given a "close and lock your visors" call to the rest of the crew.

At the same time, what they were seeing probably would have been very confusing both visually and in feeling since one's body is feeling some unusual motion after spending over two weeks in zero gee. The human body and mind has a tendency to want to block out what it can't understand and focus on what could be understood. So while I think they knew they were in a bad situation, I don't think they suspected it was THAT bad and were operating under the assumption that the orbiter was still intact with two good wings, but out of control.

posted 12-31-2008 06:33 AM               

I have to applaud NASA in discussing the intent of releasing the report with the families of the crew before the release. Even though it has been almost 6 years since the tragedy, it is still something that is hard for family members to recall, and it is reassuring to know that NASA wanted to make absolutely sure that the families were in concurrence before the release.

It seems to me that the crew was doing exactly what they were trained to do during those moments between the first alerts and the eventual breakup of the cabin. The telemetry shows that Husband and McCool were analyzing the problem, letting the computer run the re-entry throughout the process considering the complexities of a manual re-entry. As each Master Alarm came up they were checking the computers to see exactly what was wrong, and from the switch positions on the R5 panel, it even shows that McCool was trying to get hydraulic pressure from the APU's (which the report says is sometimes possible, and showed good crew knowledge) when the hydraulic pressure was lost. I think that they were doing exactly what needed to be done by walking through the situation, not thinking of the negative end but a positive one.

The fact that depressurization was very rapid and caused loss of consciousness at the end of the 40 seconds was a blessing considering that the others events that happened would have been horrifying and painful if the crew had locked their visors, much like if the crew of Challenger had pure oxygen in their PEAP's if they had been activated.

I did find it interesting that NASA went back in history and looked at the events of Challenger and Soyuz 11 for the depressurization event. It does show that NASA is understanding that since these are the only two times where depressurization and crew loss had happened in the past that these would be benchmarks in understanding what happened.

posted 12-31-2008 09:36 AM               

quote:

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Originally posted by tegwilym:
Does anyone know if there is a place to order a printed copy of this?

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posted 12-31-2008 03:21 PM               

quote:

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Originally posted by ilbasso:
I agree with the above post. The news media are getting it wrong already ("NASA blames Columbia crew loss on equipment problems")

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Having survived the initial breakup of the space shuttle, astronauts aboard Columbia were doomed by failed shoulder harnesses and helmets that allowed too much movement for the head.

The thing that disturbs me the most is that the media seems to not be reading the entire report. They are reading just the initial pages that summarize the information and finding what is the most sensational thing that makes the most sense to the news agency. One agency (Bloomberg) said in their headline that a report on "spaceship survival" seeks "better seat belts".

posted 12-31-2008 05:39 PM               

quote:

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Originally posted by Hart Sastrowardoyo:
Any indications that NASA will do a similar report on Challenger, or has too much time passed?

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posted 01-01-2009 05:13 PM               

quote:

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Originally posted by jasonelam:
the crew was doing exactly what they were trained to do during those moments between the first alerts and the eventual breakup of the cabin.

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For the crew to already be in the re-entry environment and not have a completely sealed pressure suit, and in one case not even being secured to a seat, points to a number of problems. The report discusses timeline issues; the crew being "rushed" to get last-minute items accomplished. It also mentions the poor interface between the suits and orbiter systems; the crews can't operate with visors down because it drives up the O2 concentration in the cabin and increases the threat of fire! What?

My first thought when I saw the original suit in 1988 was, "what is that helmet supposed to protect anybody from?" It's huge, and offers no form-fitting protection that an off-the-shelf motorcycle helmet would.

The report uses a mid 60's SR-71 breakup and pilot survival as a comparison point to this event. The test pilot's recollection of the event is very complimentary of the protection his David Clark suit provided him.

I certainly hope that the engineers and astronauts working on the designs for Orion and the training for it's crews take a few lessons from this report. Columbia's crew found themselves in a rapidly deteriorating situation, but were heading steadily into the flight regime in which the SR-71 pilot had amazingly survived.

posted 01-01-2009 06:28 PM               

The crew was 'working the problem' right up to the very end.

posted 01-02-2009 10:52 AM               

quote:

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Originally posted by 328KF:
Columbia's crew found themselves in a rapidly deteriorating situation, but were heading steadily into the flight regime in which the SR-71 pilot had amazingly survived.

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Cheers,

posted 01-02-2009 06:34 PM               

quote:

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Originally posted by kr4mula:
shuttle doesn't slow down that much until somewhere around 40,000 feet.

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That's interesting...in the LOC/Breakup cue card on page 3-66 of the report, it uses that altitude as the maximum for crew bailout. This procedure is intended for a Challenger-like scenario and not a re-entry scenario, so the speed and heating environment are much different, as you accurately pointed out.

The report also points out that the current ACES have never been wind tunnel tested, so no one really knows what they a capable of. No one, including the SR-71 pilot, would have ever thought that an inflight break-up at his altitude and in excess of Mach 3 was possible, but that suit proved everyone wrong.

I find it highly unlikely that in a tumbling cabin, the flight deck crew would be able to make it down to the hatch, and only a slightly better chance of going out the overhead windows.

The bottom line in this report is that, from a crew survivability standpoint, the shuttle is a far from perfect design. Orion will have no requirement for crew egress in airborne emergencies. Like Apollo, the CM is the escape capsule.

I just hope that they take these suit, seatbelt, and head support issues to heart and design as safe a vehicle as is humanly possible.

posted 01-03-2009 01:00 PM               

quote:

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Originally posted by 328KF:
The bottom line in this report is that, from a crew survivability standpoint, the shuttle is a far from perfect design.

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It's not a perfect design for anything, IMHO. Manned vehicles have their place for some applications, but not for delivering payloads to orbit. Once you put a manned compartment on that vehicle, your mission changes from delivering that payload to orbit to getting the crew to space and back in one piece - no matter what you're carrying in the back.

That said, any reax from the private spaceflight sector? I know Melville said he had some problems during re-entry during SS1, and he wasn't wearing an ACES. How does this report change, if anything, how those companies plans to carry passengers? If an accident like Columbia can shut down NASA's shuttle for a few years, what will the first accident on board a private spacecraft do for the industry?

posted 01-03-2009 09:57 PM               

Speed and altitude are two different things. Joe Kittinger as great as his accomplishment was is still an artificial situation. You are not going to step off a stationary platform at 100,000 feet and test an escape system. Mach 3 is just were the tests should start.

Guys like you are going to make the difference. Continue to voice your opinion.

To blame the STS-107 tragedy on faulty shoulder harness is ludicrous.

posted 01-04-2009 02:50 AM               

Although the report doesn't actually come right out and say it, it does appear from what I've read in it that the bodies of the astronauts were apparently "denuded" (i.e. the slipstream ripped the clothing off).

One thing to keep in mind about SR-71 ejections is that there are two large balls on the backs of the flight crew's boots. When ejection is initiated, they are locked into a pair of sockets on the ejection seat. This is done to keep the legs from flailing loose as apparently if you have loose legs during a mach 3 ejection, when the seat comes up out of the plane and tips bottom foreward, the slipstream has a tendency to "make a wish" with the legs if they aren't secured. The test flight crash was a bit of a unique scenario since it sounds like the initial decelleration of the pilot and his seat from mach 3 to subsonic was partly shielded by the nose of the plane itself since ejection wasn't initiated. Other flight crews have bailed out of Blackbirds though and the system has worked as advertised. So, chances are that even if somebody had survived the breakup of Columbia with their suit intact, if their arms and legs are flailing about and not tucked in... well you get the idea.

Concerning the helmet design for the LES and ACES, I imagine securing the head was a somewhat minor concern compared to providing visibility to the astronaut inside. Look at the helmet and it has a very wide view faceplate to allow the astronaut to move his head inside the helmet to see what he needs to. It has good vision above and to the sides somwhat low. The suits worn by Blackbird crews and STS-1 thru 4 were S-1030 model suits (S-1030C for Blackbird crews, S-1030A for the astronauts, today's U-2 and WB-57 crewmembers wear S-1034 suits) have a form fitting helmet where the crewmember can move his head and the helmet will move with it.

I can imagine there were probably some concerns about blind spots at certain angles from the eye line on the S-1030 suit helmets. For one thing, if you look at the cockpit of a U-2 or SR-71, there are no overhead switch panels. Everything is down low and either in front or just off to the side at shallow angles. With shuttle, there are some rather large overhead switch panels on the flight deck and on the mid-deck, there is stuff related to the bailout checklists that has to be seen. As such, a larger helmet where one can move their head freely inside has its benefits.

I'm not sure how they overcame this limitation in STS-1 through 4 with the older suits, but the overhead switch panel on Columbia was a bit different back then as the panel also had blow away sections that would come off with the roof panels if the ejection sequence was initiated. When the other orbiters were brought online (and Columbia got its pre- STS-9 refit), the overhead panel seemed to grow in the number of switches it had.

posted 01-13-2009 12:38 AM               

quote:

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Originally posted by tegwilym:
Does anyone know if there is a place to order a printed copy of this?

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posted 01-13-2009 01:28 PM               

Tom

posted 01-19-2009 05:00 PM               

As such, some of the charts might be a little difficult to read as they were originally designed for a full color PDF. Same goes for some of the still images of the video analysis.